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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LUCILLE JESSE MOFFAT THORNOCK, 
et al., 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. No. 16231 
LOIS S. COOK, et al., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action whereby plaintiffs-
respondents, LUCILLE JESSE MOFFAT THORNOCK, et al., 
(hereinafter "THORNOCK"), seek to quiet title, pur-
suant to §78-40-1, et ~·, Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 
9A 1977), to all minerals in, upon, or under certain 
real property located in Rich County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
THORNOCK'S Complaint was filed on January 30, 
1978. Thereafter, the court entered its Order Allowing 
Service by Publication (R. 17-18). Service by Publica-
tion was completed on February 23, 1978, (R. 36). COOK 
filed her Answer on February 21, 1978 and a default 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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certificate as to all defendants except COOK was entered 
on April 6, 1978, (R. 38). 
Thereafter, THORNOCK moved for Summary Judg-
ment (R. 31-3), in response to which COOK filed an 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim (R. 43 et~.). 
The lower court held its initial hearing on 
THORNOCK 'S Motion for Summary Judgment on April 17, 
1978, and continued the hearing, without date, allowi~ 
both parties an opportunity to file additional docu-
ments. 
A second hearing on THORNOCK' S Motion for 
Summary Judgment was held on September 5, 1978, at which 
time the matter was taken under advisement. 
Subsequent to this hearing, COOK filed her 
Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim (R. 339-48). 
On October 23, 1978, the lower court entered 
its Memorandum Decision granting THORNOCK 'S Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 349), and entering its Judgment and 
Decree of Quiet Title (R. 358-61 and 354-57). 
On November 28, 1978, COOK filed her "Objec-
tion to Plaintiff's Proposed Decree of Quiet Title, 
Judgment and Order Releasing Lis Pendens and Motion for 
Re-argument" (R. 368-72). The lower court rendered it5 
Memorandum Decision denying COOK' s Objection and Motion 
on December 11, 1978, (R. 377). COOK'S Notice of Appeal 
was filed on December 26, 1978, (R. 380). 
- 2 -
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant, COOK, seeks reversal of 
the lower court's Judgment of November 16, 1978, and of 
that court's Memorandum Decision dated December 11, 
1978. 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, THORNOCK, seek 
affirmation of the Judgment of November 16, 1978, 
the Decree of Quiet Title of that same date and of the 
Memorandum Decision of December 11, 1978. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this appeal, only those facts 
which were properly before the lower court pursuant to 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, shall be re-
lated. Those facts, which may properly be considered, 
consist of the documents which constitute the chain of 
title to the disputed minerals, the testimony of 
Defendant-Appellant COOK, given at her deposition, and 
those statements of fact contained in the affidavits 
filed by THORNOCK. Although COOK'S Statement of Facts, 
except for characterizations, is largely correct, 
THORNOCK wishes this court to become aware of certain 
details set forth below, which were omitted from that 
Statement. 
CHAIN OF TITLE 
For purposes of clarity, only those aspects of 
the Chain of Title which are pertinent to this action, 
- 3 -
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or which are claimed by COOK to constitute a defect 
in THORNOCK'S title will be discussed. 
Through various conveyances, THORNOCK'S 
predecessors-in-interest, Joseph Hatch and Catherine 
Hatch, obtained title to approximately 1,946 acres 
of real property located in Rich County, Utah. 
COOK alleges two of those conveyances, thro~h 
which Joseph Hatch obtained title, are subject to 
question. 
The first conveyance involves Utah State 
Patent No. 15259, which purports to convey certain real 
property to "Joseph E. Hatch and company" (R. 238). 
This conveyance affects approximately 273 acres of the 
2,900 acres to which THORNOCK seeks to quiet title. 
The second conveyance questioned by COOK 
involves Patent No. 15260, dated November 22, 1933, (R. 
250) which purports to convey certain real property to 
"Joseph E. Hatch and Ezra T. Hatch". This questioned 
conveyance involves approximately 80 of the 1, 946 acres 
in question. 
Subsequent to these questioned conveyances a~ 
to others through which Joseph and Catherine Hatch 
obtained title, the entire 1, 946 acres was conveyed to 
their four daughters (R. 245). 
- 4 -
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Thereafter, by Warranty Deed dated April 25, 
1947, the four sisters conveyed the subject property to 
Aden w. Thornock (R. 217). 
On May 14, 1950, a Contract and Agreement was 
executed by and between Aden W. Thornock, party of the 
first part, and Lawrence B. Johnson, party of the second 
part, for the sale of the subject property (R. 218). 
That Contract provides in pertinent part: 
No. 5. The party of the first part 
herein reserves all rights according 
to what rights may have been confer-
red in the patents to the above-
described land for all coal, oil and 
other minerals on the above-
described land. 
(R. 218) 
Pursuant to that Contract, on June 30, 1950, a 
Warranty Deed (hereinafter the "Thornock-Johnson Deed") 
conveying the subject property to Lawrence B. Johnson 
was executed (R. 219). That Deed provides in perti-
nent part: 
Reserving to the grantees herein all 
coal, oil and other minerals as may 
have been granted in the original 
patents to the above-described 
land. [emphasis added] 
(R. 219) 
On December 1, 1952, defendant Lois S. Cook 
and Howland J. cook, now deceased, obtained title to the 
surface of the subject property through a Warranty Deed, 
(hereinafter, the "Johnson-Cook Deed") executed by 
Lawrence B. Johnson, and his wife, Lois L. Johnson 
- 5 -
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(R. 220). That Deed contains the identical language of 
reservation as found in the Thornock-Johnson Deed. It 
provides: 
Reserving to the Grantee herein all 
coal, oil and other minerals as may 
have been granted in the original 
patent to the above-described land. 
[Emphasis added] (R. 220) 
Thereafter, in order to alleviate any confu-
sion generated by this obvious scrivener error in the 
reservation clause, Howland J. Cook and Lois s. Cook 
executed a Quitclaim Deed For Coal Oil and Other 
Minerals, (hereinafter, the "Cook-Thornock Quitclaim 
Deed"), on September 2, 1959, thereby conveying their 
interest in the subject minerals to Aden w. Thornock 
(R. 224). 
It is important to note that the "Cook-
Thornock Quitclaim Deed" specifically describes the 
interest intended to be conveyed as follows: 
The Granters intend by this instru-
ment to convey to the Grantee only 
the rights reserved to the Grantee 
for coal, oil and other minerals as 
may have been granted in the origi-
nal patents to the above-described 
land and as reserved [in 
certain identified documents] 
in the official records of Rich 
County, Utah. 
(R. 224) 
PLAINTIFFS' AFFIDAVITS 
The affidavit of Lucille M. Thornock, the 
widow of Aden w. Thornock, (R. 103-20), establishes 
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several uncontroverted facts. Briefly, in 1958 and 1959 
Aden w. Thornock began leasing the mineral estate which 
is presently at issue. During that period, he became 
aware of some "minor problem" with the reservation of 
the mineral estate in the various conveyances and for 
that reason requested COOK and her, now deceased, 
husband to provide him with a quitclaim deed to the 
mineral estate. To this end, affiant and her husband 
conveyed an additional forty acres to the Cooks, to no 
avail. 
It became necessary to retain an attorney, 
M. C. Harris, Esq. of Logan, Utah. Mr. Harris made a 
formal demand, attached to Lucille Thornock's affidavit 
as Exhibit "A", upon the Cooks for a quitclaim deed. In 
response to the demands of Mr. Harris, Mrs. Thornock was 
supplied with a document 'entitled "Quitclaim Deed for 
Coal, Oil and Other Minerals", a copy of which is 
attached to her affidavit as Exhibit "C" (R. 118-20). 
In addition, Mrs. Thornock states that neither 
herself, nor her late husband, ever retained or 
consulted Mr. Victor Sagers of the firm of Dahl & 
Sagers. 
The affidavit of Burton H. Harris supports and 
corroborates the affidavit of Lucille Thornock (R. 
121-25). Mr. Harr is, the present managing partner of 
the law firm of Harris, Preston & Gutke of Logan, Utah, 
- 7 -
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states that M. C. Harris was formally a partner in the 
predecessor firm of Harr is, Preston & Gutke and that the 
records of the predecessor firm have been maintained in 
the regular course of business. Mr. Harr is states that 
the documents attached to his affidavit as Exhibits "A" 
and "B" (R. 124-25) are maintained in the "closed" law 
off ice files of the late M. C. Harr is. Those documents 
are copies of the letter of demand and transmittal 
letter which also are attached to the affidavit of Mrs. 
Thornock. 
DEPOSITION OF LOIS S. COOK 
The testimony of COOK given during the taking 
of her deposition on March 21, 1978, directly contra-
dicts the denials and affirmative allegations of her 
Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim (R. 339-48). 
Specifically, Mrs. Cook testified that the 
Cook-Thornock Quitclaim Deed was executed by herself: 
Q. 
A. 
[By Mr. Jensen] Was this 
document, and I am referring 
to Exhibit 1. [the cook-
Thornock Quitclaim Deed] ., 
executed because of the con-
tinual requests of Mr. Thornock, 
to which you have referred? 
He hounded us continually and my 
husband said, "You sign this 
paper." So I did, but he was 
after us continually. 
(Cook Depo. p.10, lines 11-16) 
In addition, in support of the testimony 
quoted immediately above, Mrs. Cook stated: 
- 8 -
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Q. [By Mr. Jensen] Referring to 
the third page of Exhibit •1• 
[the Cook-Thornock 
Quitclaim Deed] . which is 
before you, and directing your 
attention to the signature 
line, which is signature 
one--directing your attention to 
the signature line thereon, does 
that appear to be your 
signature? 
A. Yes. It looks like it. 
Q. And does that appear to be the 
signature of your deceased 
husband? 
A. I don't know but I would say it 
looks like it. 
Q. The question is: Do you have 
any reason to believe that 
these signatures to which I have 
directed your attention are 
anything 9ther than the sig-
natures they purport to be? 
A. No. 
(Cook 
19-25, 
13-16) 
Depo. p. 13, 
p. 14, lines 
lines 
1 , 2 , 
As to the allegations of coercion, threat and 
duress contained in COOK'S Second Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim (R. 340), Mrs. Cook testified: 
Q. [By Mr. Jensen] And when you 
say that he was hounding you for 
something, can you remember what 
it was? 
A. Well, no. He wanted us to sign 
some papers and I didn't believe 
in it. 
- 9 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. I understand that, but do you 
recall what Mr. Thornock said to 
you? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you recall what he may have 
said to your husband? 
A. I don't know. 
(Cook Depo. p. 19, lines 10-19) 
Q. [By Mr. Jensen] I am referring 
to Aden Thornock. Did he 
threaten you with physical 
violence when he approached 
you? 
A. Oh, no. 
Q. Nothing like that? 
A. No. 
(Cook Depo. p. 21, lines 13-18) 
Q. [By Mr. Axland] I want you to 
itemize for me each and every 
incident wherein Mr. Thornock 
was continually after you to 
sign something. 
[Instruction to the witness by Mr. 
Oman omitted] 
A. I can't do that. 
many years ago. 
That's too 
Q. I want you to give me your best 
recollection then, Mrs. Cook, of 
precisely what Mr. Thornock 
did. 
A. I can't 
I can't ( c 0 0 k 
15-24) 
do that. I don't know. 
do that. 
Depo. p. 45, lines 
- 10 -
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A. I can't say the precise things 
that he said years ago. 
Q. Did you have conversations with 
Mr. Thornock. 
A. Not many, only when he came to 
me. 
(Cook Depo. p. 45, lines 3-6) 
Q. [By Mr. Ax land] Did anyone 
force you to sign Exhibit "l" 
[the Cook-Thornock Quit-
claim Deed] to your 
deposition? 
A. No. 
Q. Did anyone threaten you? 
A. No. 
Q. Did anyone coerce you to sign 
Exhibit "l"? 
A. I signed it ·because my husband 
wanted me to. 
Q. Did anyone, to your knowledge, 
force or threaten your husband 
to require him to sign it? 
' A. I don't know. 
Q. Do you have any facts in your 
possession at this time that 
anyone, Mr. Thornock or anyone 
else in the world, threatened 
your husband to sign Exhibit 
"l"? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Mrs. Cook, do you have any facts 
in your possession. 
A. No. 
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Q. Did anyone threaten you or your 
husband, fore ing him to sign 
Exhibit "l"? 
A. No. 
(Cook Depo. p. 51, lines 19-25, 
p. 52, lines 1-13) 
Q. Did anyone use bodily force to 
require your husband to sign 
Exhibit "l"? 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. Do you have any facts that 
anyone threatened your husband 
with any kind of action if he 
did not sign Exhibit "l"? 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. Okay. Now you have indicated 
further that Mr. Thornock was 
not present when Exhibit "l" was 
signed; isn't that correct? 
A. Right. 
In 
I 
(Cook Depo. p. 53, lines 2-7, 
14-17) 
summary, Mrs. Cook testified that: 
signed the Cook-Thornock Quitclaim Deed, 
signature which purports to be that of Howland 
appears to be that of her deceased husband, 
( 1) she 
( 2) the 
J. cook 
( 3) she 
knows of no facts which would tend to indicate that the 
signatures which appear on the qui tel aim deed are other 
than what they purport to be, (4) the quitclaim deed 
was signed at the request of Aden W. Thornock, (5) a 
- 12 -
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quitclaim deed was the only document which she signed 
at the request of Mr. Thornock, ( 6) although she 
characterized her contacts with Aden w. Thornock as 
"hounding", she does not recall even the substance of 
Mr. Thornock 's statements during those encounters, (7) 
she was not threatened or coerced by Mr. Thornock, (8) 
to her knowledge, her deceased husband was neither 
threatened nor coerced and, ( 9) Aden w. Thornock 
was not present at the time the quitclaim deed was 
signed. 
Other than in matters of characterization, the 
Statement of Facts contained in COOK'S Brief on Appeal 
appears to be correct with the exception of the state-
ment contained in subparagraph (d) found on page 5 of 
COOK' s Brief. In essence, COOK has stated she has no 
recollection of executing the Cook-Thornock Quitclaim 
Deed. This statement is correct insofar as Mrs. Cook 
testified to no specific recollection of the immediate 
circumstances surrounding the execution of the quitclaim 
deed. However, the court's attention is directed to the 
fact that Mrs. Cook does not dispute the authenticity of 
the signatures appearing on that deed, (Cook Depo. pages 
37, 38), and that she does recall executing that docu-
ment at the request of Mr. Thornock and her, now de-
ceased, husband (Cook Depo. p. 10, lines 11-16). 
- 13 -
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ARGUMENT 
Defendant-appellant COOK, in her Brief on 
Appeal, claims error on the part of the lower court in 
two respects. One claim involves an alleged question of 
fact pertaining to the validity of the Cook-Thornock 
Quitclaim Deed, the other, an alleged error of law in 
the interpretation of the Thornock' s chain of title and 
a consequent claim by adverse possession. Those issues 
will be discussed separately. 
As COOK makes no objection to the lower 
court's ruling concerning the scrivener errors found in 
the reservation clauses of the Thornock-Johnson and 
Johnson-Cook Warranty Deeds that aspect of this action 
will not be addressed (see the lower court's first and 
second Memorandum Decisions, R. 349 and 377). 
POINT I 
COOK MAY NOT PROPERLY ASSERT A CLAIM BY VIRTUE OF 
ADVERSE POSSESSION AND MAY NOT RAISE AN ALLEGED 
DEFECT IN THORNOCK'S TITLE AS A DEFENSE 
Two fundamental precepts of the law preclude 
COOK'S claim to title by adverse possession and her 
assertion of alleged defects in Thornock' s chain of 
title. Those fundamental considerations are: (1) under 
Utah law one may claim through adverse possession only 
under a claim of title, and (2) in defense of an action 
to quiet title, a defect in plaintiff's chain of title 
may be asserted only if the defendant claims title by 
virtue of the defect. 
- 14 -
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Sections 78-12-8 and 78-12-10 Utah Code Ann. 
(Rep!. Vol. 9A 1977) provide for assertion of title by 
virtue of adverse possession. Section 78-12-8 provides 
for adverse possession by those who enter possession 
under a claim of title founded upon a written instrument 
or judgment. Section 78-12-10 provides for adverse 
possession under a claim not founded upon a written 
instrument or judgment but under a claim of title. 
There is no provision under Utah law for 
assertion of adverse possession where the claimant has 
entered into possession without claim of title. 
Equally basic to the law of real property is 
the proposition that a defendant in an action to quiet 
title cannot defeat plaintiff's title by showing a 
superior title in some third person through whom the 
defendant makes no claim. As noted by the court in 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. v. Hatton, 156 
Kan. 673, 135 p. 2d 559 ( 1943): 
In an action to quiet title where it 
is shown that the plaintiff is in 
actual possession of the property in 
controversy, the defendant cannot 
defeat the plaintiff's action except 
by showing a paramount right in 
himself. He cannot defeat such ac-
tion by showing a superior title in 
some third person. (135 P.2d at 563) 
This basic proposition is perhaps most suc-
cinctly stated at 65 AmJur 2d QUIETING TITLE §45 as 
follows: 
- 15 -
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One cannot defeat a quiet title bill 
by showing that the complainant's 
claim or interest . • . is subject 
to superior rights in third persons 
who are not parties to the suit; it 
is sufficient that the interest 
asserted by complainant in posses-
sion be superior to that of those 
who are parties defendant. In this 
regard, it has been said that the 
court determines the rights of the 
parties under the pleadings and 
evidence, grants proper relief, and 
determines the better title as 
between the parties to the proceed-
ing, though a title superior to the 
rights of either party may be held 
by stranger to the suit. 
In the present action, COOK asserts title to 
approximately 352.88 acres through a simultaneous 
contradiction of both these basic principles. 
In brief, COOK argues that THORNOCK'S chain of 
title is defective by virtue of the absence of convey-
ances of approximately 80 acres from Joseph Hatch and 
Ezra Hatch to Joseph Hatch and Katie Hatch and of 
approximately 272.88 acres from Joseph E. Hatch and 
company to Joseph Hatch and Katie Hatch. 
As these parcels are included in the property 
conveyed to COOK by Johnson, COOK, of course, has been 
in actual possession of the surface since the date of 
conveyance. 
COOK argues that neither THORNOCK nor her 
h ld . tl to this small predecessors-in-interest e ti e 
portion of the land due to the alleged defects and 
- 16 -
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d 
further that she has obtained title to the same through 
adverse possession. For purposes of clarification, a 
simplified diagram of the chain of title with emphasis 
on the alleged defects is attached hereto as Exhibit 
nA n. 
As is apparent from the diagram attached as 
Exhibit "A", COOK'S claim of title is derived through 
Aden W. Thornock. COOK has no claim of title by virtue 
of any interest which may reside in Ezra Hatch or in 
Joseph E. Hatch and company. Therefore, she derives no 
interest from the alleged defects in title. 
For these reasons, COOK is placed in the 
incongruous position of either denying her own claim of 
title or admitting the validity of THORNOCK'S title. 
An essential element of COOK'S adverse posses-
sion is an assertion that she possesses the property 
under a claim of title. That claim of title is derived 
through Aden w. Thornock. By asserting this claim of 
title COOK simultaneously concedes the validity of 
THORNOCK'S title. 
In short, Cook has attempted to simultaneously 
deny and assert the validity of THORNOCK 'S title. 
Unlike Joseph Heller's famed "Catch-22", there 
is an avenue of escape from this logical labyrinth. 
COOK may not claim title by adverse possession for the 
reason that an essential element of her assertion is 
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self-defeating. In fact, any allegation that THORNOCK 
has no title to the questioned 300 acres also serves as 
a denial of COOK'S claim of title to the same parcel, 
thereby rendering her a stranger to the title and 
defeating any claim by adverse possession. 
Similarly, COOK may not raise the alleged 
defects in THORNOCK' S chain of title in defense of this 
quiet title action. By asserting those defects, she, 
of necessity, denies her own title to the questioned 300 
acres, thus becoming a stranger to the title. As a 
stranger to the title she has no standing to attack 
THORNOCK'S title. 
In summary, COOK must concede the validity of 
THORNOCK'S title as a prerequisite to an assertion of 
adverse possession, and for that reason the claim by 
adverse possession must fail. In addition, she may not 
raise the alleged defect in THORNOCK' s chain of title as 
a defense to th~ quiet title action because by doing so, 
she becomes a stranger to the 300 acres thus precluding 
her attack on THORNOCK 'S title as to that portion. 
POINT II 
SHOULD THIS COURT FIND COOK'S CLAIM BY 
ADVERSE POSSESSION VALID, TITLE TO THE 
MINERALS REMAINS IN THORNOCK 
Should this Court find COOK'S claim by adverse 
possession to approximately 300 of the 1,946 acres 
OCK still involved in this action to be valid, THORN 
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retains title to the minerals, for two distinct reasons. 
The doctrine of after-acquired title is applicable to 
the reservation of minerals in the Thornock-Johnson and 
Johnson-Cook Deeds and also to the Cook-Thornock Quit-
claim Deed. 
The lower court has ruled that the language of 
reservation found in the Thornock-Johnson and Johnson-
Cook deeds serves to reserve all rights to minerals 
to the grantors (R. 349 and 377). COOK does not contest 
that portion of the court's decision. 
The effect of this reservation of title to 
minerals is to "reconvey" the minerals from the grantee 
back to the grantor. 
This basic distinction between a reservation 
and an exception is noted at 23 AmJur 2d DEEDS §262, 
where it is stated: 
Where the terms are used in their 
strict or accurate sense, there is 
an important distinction between a 
"reservation" and "exception" 
in a conveyance of land. A 
"reservation," on the one hand, is 
the creation in behalf of the 
grantor of a new right issuing out 
of the thing granted, something 
which did not exist as an 
independent right before the grant. 
On the other hand, an "exception" 
operates to withdraw some part of 
the thing granted which would 
otherwise pass to the grantee under 
the general description •.. A 
reservation is the taking back of a 
part of that already granted · 
In short, an exception exludes some 
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part of the thing from the con-
veyance and the title to that 
part remains in the grantor by 
virtue of its original title, while 
a reservation creates a new right 
out of the subject of the grant and 
is originated by the conveyance. 
This Court has recently recognized this 
important distinction in Burton v. United States, 29 
Ut.2d 226, 507 P.2d 710 (1973) where the court 
stated: 
An exception excludes from the grant 
the property or estate therein 
described. If a conveyance contains 
a reservation, the entire property 
or estate described passes to the 
grantee, subject to the right, 
estate, or easements reserved. The 
£~~~£Y~iiQ~_££~~!~~-~-~~~-£i~g! 
issuing out of the property granted, 
which did not exist as an independ-
ent right before the grant [emphasis 
added] (507 P.2d at 712). 
As a reservation creates a new and independent 
right issuing from the grantee back to the gr an tor, it 
must be treated as a conveyance. 
By virtue of the provisions of Section 57-1-3 
Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 6A 1974) a grant of fee 
simple is presumed unless it appears from the conveyance 
that a lesser estate was intended. No language evidenc-
ing an intent to convey a lesser estate is found 
in the reservation clauses of either the Thornock-
Johnson or Johnson-Cook deeds; therefore, a reconveyance 
of all minerals to the grantor in fee is presumed. 
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Because the reconveyance of minerals is in fee 
simple, the provisions as to after-acquired title found 
in Section 57-1-10 Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. GA 1974) 
are applicable. 
Therefore, should the court find that COOK 
obtained title to the questioned 300 acres by adverse 
possession, title to the minerals passed immediately, 
through application of the doctrine of after-acquired 
title, from COOK to Johnson and immediately from Johnson 
to Aden W. Thornock and thence to his heirs. 
The doctrine of after-acquired title is 
similarly applicable to the Cook-Thornock Quitclaim 
Deed, but on a somewhat different basis. 
In her Brief on Appeal, COOK has ably cited 
those cases and authorities which stand for the general 
proposition that the doctrine of after-acquired title is 
inapplicable in the context of a quitclaim deed. 
However, Cook has failed to note the rationale for this 
general rule and hence the exception to that rule which 
is presently applicable. 
The general proposition, as well as the 
exception, are stated at 23 AmJur 2d DEEDS Section 303 
as follows: 
A conveyance, although using the 
terminology of a quit-claim deed, 
may be regarded as something more 
than such a deed and operate to 
estop the grantor from asserting an 
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after-acquired title, when it 
recites further that a definite 
estate is conveyed thereby, or 
when the circumstances clearly 
indicate that, as between the 
parties thereto, a particular 
interest or estate was intended to 
be passed by the instrument. 
This exception was implemented by the court in 
McAdams v. Bailey, 169 Ind. 518, 82 N.E. 1057 (1907) 
where the court held that a distinct recital in a 
quitclaim deed, evidencing that the parties proceeded 
on the theory that a particular interest was thereby 
conveyed, may be as effective to create an estoppel as a 
warranty. 
Brief examination of the Cook-Thornock Quit-
claim Deed reveals an obvious intent to convey a partic-
ular, identifiable, presently existing interest. 
That deed provides in pertinent part: 
The grantors intend by this instru-
ment to convey to the grantee 
only the rights reserved to the 
grantee for coal, oil and other 
minerals as may have been granted in 
the orig in al patents to the above-
descr ibed land and as reserved in 
(various indentif ied 
documents) in the official 
records of Rich County, Utah. 
(R. 224) 
This identification of a particular interest 
could not be more absolute. In addition, the intent to 
d · l on the face of the convey a efinite estate is c ear 
document. 
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Due to these factors, the doctrine of after-
acquired title is applicable. Therefore, should the 
court find COOK obtained title to the questioned 300 
acres through adverse possession, title to the minerals 
therein immediately vested in the heirs of Aden w. 
Thornock through application of the doctrine of after-
acquired title. 
In brief, as the doctrine of after-acquired 
title is applicable to both the reservations of minerals 
found in the Thornock-Johnson and Johnson-Cook deeds as 
well as to the Cook-Thornock Quitclaim Deed, should the 
court find that COOK has obtained title to the ques-
tioned 300 acres through adverse possession, title to 
the minerals is vested in THORNOCK • 
. POINT III 
THERE IS NO QUESTION OF FACT AS TO THE VALIDITY 
OF THE COOK-THORNOCK QUITCLAIM DEED 
In her Brief on Appeal, COOK questions the 
validity of the cook-Thornock Quitclaim Deed and im-
pliedly asserts that a question of fact exists as to the 
circumstances of its execution. However, absent the 
unfounded allegations contained in Cook's Second Amended 
Answer and Counterclaim (R. 339-48) and in Cook's Brief 
on Appeal, she has failed to produce any evidence which 
would tend to support her allegation of the existence of 
a question of fact. 
- 23 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The allegations and conclusions contained in 
COOK'S Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim may not 
properly be considered by this court. Rule 56(e), ~ 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides, • aff id av its 
shall • set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence The legal conclusions found in 
the Second Amended Answer would not be admissible in 
evidence at the time of trial and therefore may not be 
considered in the context of a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
In addition, the testimony of Lois Cook 
given at her deposition directly contradicts the Con-
clusions and Allegations of the Second Amended Answer. 
In her Answer, COOK has denied executing the 
Cook-Thornock Quitclaim Deed (R. 380). However, at p~e 
10, lines 11-16 of her deposition, she admits that she 
signed that deed at the request of her husband. 
COOK further alleges that she signed the 
quitclaim deed under "threats, coercion and duress.' 
However, at page 19, lines 10-19 of her deposition 
she testified that she had no recollection of state-
ments made by Mr. Thornock and that she had no knowled~ 
of statements he may have made to her husband. She 
further testifies at page 21, lines 13-18 that there 
were no threats of physical violence, and at pages 51 • 
52 and 53 of her deposition, Cook acknowledged she was 
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not forced to sign the quitclaim deed, that she was not 
threatened, that she was not coereced and that she has 
no knowledge of any threats or coercion directed at her 
husband. In addition, she acknowledged that Aden 
Thornock was not present at the time the quitclaim deed 
was signed. 
The testimony of Lois Cook, as contained in 
the transcript of her deposition, is the only evidence 
properly before the court concerning the issue of the 
validity of the quitclaim deed. A review of her testi-
mony clearly indicates that, as a matter of law, the 
execution of the quitclaim deed was not obtained through 
threat, coercion or duress. 
COOK attempts to raise an additional issue 
concerning the presence of a handwritten insertion on 
the first page of the c.ook-Thornock quitclaim deed. 
There is no evidence before the court concerning that 
insertion other than that it is present. COOK acknowl-
edges that the only surviving witness to the execution 
of that document, Mrs. Cook herself, has no specific 
recollection of the circumstances surrounding its 
execution (COOK' s Brief on Appeal, page 11) • Due to 
this absence of evidence, COOK may only speculate as to 
the presence or absence of the insertion at the time of 
the execution of the quitclaim deed. Clearly, summary 
judgment may not be set aside on the sole basis of 
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speculation, especially where, as in the present case, 
there is !!.£ possibility that additional evidence might 
be obtained. 
As to COOK'S reference to the manner of the 
taking of her deposition, THORNOCK assumes, as does this 
Court, that the interests of appellant were protected ~ 
competent counsel. 
In summary, on the record, the only hint of 
duress, coercion or estoppel is COOK'S characterization 
of Aden Thornock' s requests as "hounding", however, her 
specific testimony as to Mr. Thornock' s conduct demon-
strates that, as a matter of law, neither duress, 
threat, nor coercion were present. 
CONCLUSION 
COOK'S claim by adverse position to 300 of the 
approximately 1,946 acres involved in the present actioo 
must fail for the reason that a prerequisite to the 
assertion of that claim is an acknowledgment of the 
validity of the title of Aden w. Thornock to the same 
parcel. As COOK does not contest the lower court's 
ruling concerning the reservations of minerals in the 
Thornock-Johnson and Johnson-Cook deeds, acknowledgement 
of the validity of the title of Aden w. Thornock con-
stitutes an admission of THORNOCK'S claim to quiet 
title. 
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.. 
The alleged defects in THORNOCK'S chain of 
title may not properly be asserted by COOK as she claims 
no interest in the land by virtue of those defects and 
for the further reason that a defendant cannot defeat an 
action to quiet title by showing a superior title in 
some third person. 
As is apparent from a review of the transcript 
of the deposition of Lois S. Cook, there is no question 
of fact, on the record, as to the validity of the 
Cook-Thornock Quitclaim Deed. 
Finally, even should the court find COOK'S 
claim to 300 acres by adverse possession to be valid, 
the title to the minerals therein has vested in Thornock 
by virtue of application of the doctrine of after-
acquired title. 
Plaintiffs-respondents, THORNOCK, respectfully 
request that this Court affirm the Judgment, and Decree 
of Quiet Title, and Memorandum Decision of December 11, 
1978 of the court below. 
DATED this f(d day of May, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LeROY$. AXLAND, Esq. 
iffs-Respondents 
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State of Utah 
Patent No. 
15260 (80 A.) 
JosepJ Hatch and 
Ezra Hatch 
\ 
z 
No Conveyance 
z 
State of Utah 
Patent No. 
15259 (273.88 A.) 
I 
Joseph E. Hatch 
and company 
I 
z No Conveyance 
z 
A B c 
\ I various irrelevant conveyances // / 
Joseph Hatch and Katie Hatch 
I 
FOUR SISTERS 
(Lota Kennedy, Leatha Spencer, 
Vera Pearl, and Thelma McKinnon) 
I 
Aden w. Thornock 
I 
(with reservation of minerals) 
I 
Lawrence Johnson 
I 
(with reservation of minerals) 
I 
Howland Cook and Lois Cook 
~ (Quit Claim for Minerals) 
~ 
Aden W. Thornock 
EXHIBIT "A II 
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